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On February 24-25, 2006 an international workshop on “Regional and 
International Currency Arrangements” was held in Vienna. It was co-sponsored 
by the Oesterreichische Nationalbank and the Bank of Greece, and jointly 
organized by Eduard Hochreiter and George Tavlas. Academic economists and 
researchers from central banks and international organizations presented and 
discussed current research, and reviewed and assessed the past experience with, 
and the future challenges of, international currency arrangements. A number of 
papers and the contributions by the discussants presented at this workshop are 
being made available to a broader audience in the Working Paper series of the 
Bank of Greece and simultaneously also in the Working Paper Series of the 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank. The papers and the discussants’ comments will 
be published in the journal, International Economics and Economic Policy. 
Here we present the first of these papers. In addition to the paper by Otmar 
Issing, the Working Paper also contains the contributions of the discussants, 
Mario Blejer and Leslie Lipschitz. 
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1.  Monetary union as a corner solution to exchange rate regimes 
The selection of exchange rate regime is one of the most fundamental policy 
issues in macroeconomics. The spectrum of possible choices ranges from the hard peg 
to a freely floating nominal exchange rate, with a variety of intermediate 
arrangements that are often called soft pegs. This latter group of regimes includes the 
conventional fixed (but adjustable) exchange rate, the crawling peg, an exchange rate 
band, and a crawling band. A crawling peg is given by a peg that can shift gradually 
over time. An exchange rate band is defined by the central bank having committed 
itself to a certain range for the exchange rate, while a crawling band is an exchange 
rate band that can shift over time. A managed float is an exchange rate regime that 
lies between the soft pegs and the freely floating. In this case the central bank may 
intervene in the exchange rate market, but it has not committed itself to a certain 
exchange rate or exchange rate band. The hard pegs include currency boards and 
situations where a country does not have a domestic currency, such as in a monetary 
union 
There are three main reasons why a country may want to peg its exchange rate. 
First, a floating exchange rate can be highly volatile and be difficult to predict not 
only in the short run, but also in the longer run. The costs that are linked to such 
exchange rate uncertainty are difficult to quantify and differ according to factors like 
size and degree of openness of a country. Second, pegging to a low-inflation currency 
may serve as a commitment device to help contain domestic inflation pressures. 
Third, for countries attempting to bring inflation down from excessive levels, fixed 
rates may help to control price developments for traded goods and provide an anchor 
for inflation expectations in the private sector. 
Throughout modern history we have seen a number of periods when a fixed 
exchange rate has been the dominant regime. A common feature of such regimes 
seems to be the key role of the currency of a leading country (“key currency”) such as 
the British Pound in the 19
th century and the US dollar after the second world war (see 
Issing, 1965). During the late 1800s and early 1900s the classical gold standard 
prevailed (see, for example, Eichengreen, 1996). After its political unification in 1871 
Germany, adopting the British example, went on a gold standard and a large number 
of European as well as South and North American countries followed suit, thereby 
creating a system of fixed exchange rates (with small fluctuation bands reflecting the   8
costs of gold transportation). The first negotiated system of fixed exchange rates, 
however, was the Bretton Woods system. In contrast with the classical gold standard, 
the Bretton Woods arrangement initially involved strict limits on capital mobility and 
the price for domestic currency was fixed relative to the U.S. Dollar (respectively to 
gold). This arrangement dominated the international monetary system from its 
introduction after World War II until its final collapse in 1973. 
After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, a majority of countries in a 
series of steps have dismantled their still existing capital controls. In Europe we have 
seen a number of attempts to create a fixed exchange rate arrangement, such as the so 
called ‘Snake’ and later the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European 
Monetary System (EMS). Following the major speculative attacks on several 
currencies in the early 1990s, however, some European countries, like Sweden and 
the United Kingdom, opted for a different regime and let their exchange rate float. 
Other countries preferred to remain within the ERM with the goal of forming a 
monetary union in Europe. 
To classify exchange rate regimes is not always easy in practise. What the 
authorities say they do (de jure) and what they actually do (de facto) sometimes 
differs considerably. Moreover, parallel and dual exchange rate markets sometimes 
existed, which further complicates a de facto classification. Fischer (2001) presents 
some evidence on the development of de facto exchange rate regimes for the IMF’s 
member countries for 1991 and 1999. Given the IMF’s evaluations of de facto 
regimes, 38 percent of the countries had either a hard peg or a floating exchange rate 
in 1991, while 62 percent had various types of soft peg arrangements. By 1999 the 
situation had essentially reversed when 66 percent of the countries had a hard peg or a 
floating exchange rate whereas only 34 percent had a soft peg arrangement.
 1 
Any scheme for classifying de facto exchange rate regimes is inherently 
subjective and therefore open to criticism. For example, it may in some circumstances 
be difficult to judge whether an exchange rate is de facto a soft peg with a very broad 
exchange rate band or a managed float. In the case of Europe, however, it seems fair 
to say that since the speculative attacks on several European currencies in the early 
1990s there has been a strong tendency for the countries to move towards the corners 
                                                 
1 Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) develop a system for classifying exchange rate regimes that also makes 
use of market determined parallel exchange rates and that goes back to 1946, covering 153 countries. 
Their system is likely to give different percentage numbers for the three exchange rate arrangements 
listed by Fischer (2001).   9
of the exchange rate regime spectrum and, in particular, in the direction towards the 
hard peg. By 2006 there are now 12 countries that have given up their domestic 
currency in favour of the euro and the 10 countries that joined the European Union in 
2004 have stated their intent of adopting the single currency once they fulfil the 
Maastricht criteria. 
At this stage we may ask what may help explain the observation that many 
countries, especially in the developed world, seem to move towards the two corners of 
the exchange rate spectrum: a hard peg or a flexible exchange rate? A well-known 
proposition for addressing this question is Mundell’s “impossible trinity”. It states that 
among the three desirable objectives: 
•  stabilize the exchange rate; 
•  free international capital mobility; and 
•  an effective monetary policy oriented towards domestic goals; 
only two can be mutually consistent. In this context it is interesting to note that this 
“impossibility theorem” was well developed before and has been “reinvented” several 
times.
2 
The impossible trinity has several other names, including the “uneasy triangle” 
and the “holy trinity”, and I will focus my attention on it in the next section. Section 3 
discusses implications of the optimum currency area theory for EMU, while political 
aspects of monetary union are considered in section 4. 
 
2.  The power of the uneasy triangle 
To understand the working of the uneasy triangle, it is instructive to consider 
separately each of the mutually consistent policy pairs in a very simplified setting. If a 
country opts for a fixed exchange rate and wants to set the domestic interest rates, 
cross border capital flows need to be restricted.
3 Otherwise, sooner or later an 
arbitrage possibility between domestic and foreign interest rates will arise. Policies of 
full international capital mobility and fixed exchange rate will similarly lead to 
arbitrage opportunities, unless domestic and international interest rates are equal. 
Thus, in this case an independent monetary policy is not possible. Using the same 
                                                 
2 For reference to the literature, see Issing (1964). 
3 Assuming that capital controls can be applied efficiently over time, which might be questionable.   10
argument, independent monetary policy and unrestricted international capital flows 
can coexist only if the exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate. 
This leads to an important question which policymakers have too often ignored. 
Which one of the three objectives should be given up? In the European context the 
question imposed by the trilemma of the uneasy triangle can, in fact, be further 
narrowed down. If we are willing to take for granted the achievements of the 
European common market, then clearly restriction of international capital mobility is 
no longer a viable policy choice for the EU. The trilemma is thus reduced to a 
dilemma. The policymaker has to choose between mutually inconsistent policy of 
exchange rate stabilization and monetary policy oriented towards domestic goals. 
Given the stark implications of the logic of the uneasy triangle, it is important to 
test if the predictions of the trilemma find empirical support. The available empirical 
studies generally provide a positive answer. Rose (1996) concludes that exchange rate 
volatility is linked to monetary policy divergence and the degree of capital mobility as 
predicted by the trilemma, but the connection is surprisingly weak. One potential 
problem of this study is the association of monetary policy independence directly with 
divergence in economic fundamentals. In a subsequent study Obstfeld, Shambaugh 
and Taylor (2004) identify monetary policy with short term nominal market interest 
rates rather than economic fundamentals in general and find a strong empirical 
support for the logic of the trilemma during the last 130 years. 
In the context of the European policy trade-offs (i.e., capital movements control 
is not an option), two more empirical studies should be mentioned. Frankel, 
Schmukler and Servén (2002) explore whether the choice of exchange rate regime 
affects the sensitivity of local interest rates to international interest rates. In support of 
the dilemma faced by European policymakers, the authors find that in the short run 
interest rates in countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes adjust more 
slowly to changes in international interest rates. In the long run only large industrial 
countries appear to have a choice of pursuing an independent monetary policy. These 
long-run findings are questioned by Shambaugh (2004), who concludes that the trade-
off between exchange rate stabilization and independent monetary policy finds 
support in the data even in the long run. 
 
   11
Historical evidence from Europe 
In addition to considering systematic empirical evidence for economies around 
the world, it is instructive to examine the historical evidence for European economies. 
Do the recent experiences in Europe comply with the predictions of the trilemma? In 
fact, the 1979-1992 period of EMS in Western Europe offers a prime example of 
policymakers’ refusal to succumb to (or failure to acknowledge) the unpleasant logic 
of the trilemma. Without doubt, both exchange rate stabilization and independent 
monetary policy featured high on the policymakers’ agenda. Until 1987, the 
unavoidable consequences of the trilemma were addressed partly by occasional 
exchange rate realignments and partly by remaining capital controls.
4 
There is a general agreement in the literature that the power of the trilemma’s 
logic caught up with the EMS policy arrangements in the 1992 crisis. After 1987 
remaining capital restrictions were eliminated (or further relaxed in case of some 
countries) and a commitment was made to avoid future realignments of the EMS 
currencies. However, by 1992 the interest rate levels required to maintain the 
exchange rate parities were not (or were perceived by the markets as being not) 
consistent with the needs of the domestic economies. The pressures of unification 
necessitated an increase in German interest rates. At the same time, a number of 
Germany’s partner countries were experiencing a period of economic weakness 
reflecting either the effects of cumulated losses of competitiveness in previous years 
due to high inflation or the impacts of the unwinding of earlier booms. These apparent 
policy dilemmas were exacerbated as markets began to doubt the credibility of the 
parities. This led to a wave of speculative attacks, resulting in the devaluations of a 
number of currencies and even exits from the exchange rate mechanism. 
EMU as the only feasible solution 
Less than a decade after the 1992 crisis, all the EMS members (except Denmark 
and the United Kingdom) joined EMU. Not only have they given up monetary policy 
independence, they have also altogether eliminated exchange rates by substituting 
national currencies with the Euro – the common currency of EMU. 
One way to understand this drastic change is to revisit the mutually consistent 
policies of the uneasy triangle. First, as already argued above, in the context of the 
                                                 
4 See Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) for more detailed discussion and further references.   12
successful economic integration in Europe, the possibility of reinstituting even partial 
restrictions on capital mobility was not a viable option. It directly contradicts with 
integration of financial markets, which is part of the common market initiative. This 
leaves open the question if capital controls can be permanently implemented 
successfully at all. 
Second, the option of monetary policy oriented towards domestic goals 
combined with flexible exchange rates was seriously considered in academic circles, 
but was never seen as a viable option by European policymakers. This is mostly 
because of political considerations and lessons learnt from the European history of the 
first half of the 20
th century.  
This leaves us with the option of stabilizing the exchange rates and giving up 
independent monetary policy. An alternative, and perhaps more insightful, way to 
express the same policy option under a paper money standard is to have exchange rate 
stability as the only goal of monetary policy for all countries but one (the n-1 regime) 
– the latter being the home of the currency to which the other currencies are pegged. 
Empirical evidence suggests that commitment to stabilize exchange rates in an 
environment of full capital mobility can rarely be sustained for periods longer than a 
few years. Only a handful of relatively small and open economies that are ready to 
subordinate, rather than co-ordinate, their monetary policy with respect to some base 
country have succeeded in maintaining fixed exchange rates (see Issing, 1965, 
Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). The few examples here include currency boards of 
countries such as Hong Kong and Estonia. For larger and more closed economies the 
commitment of monetary policy to pursue exchange rate stability as its sole objective 
is bound to lack credibility. 
Similar insights can be gained by restricting our attention to Western Europe. It 
was the smaller, relatively more open and more closely integrated countries – such as 
Austria or the Netherlands - that managed to avoid any exchange rate realignments 
with the DM already from 1979 onwards (1983 in case of the Netherlands). One can 
also note the success of the long-standing exchange rate arrangement between 
Luxemburg and Belgium. Of course, being small and open does not by itself 
guarantee the success of a peg, as the experience of Ireland within the EMS showed.   13
Economists have also emphasized the self-fulfilling crisis dimension of 
exchange rate stabilization policies.
5 In this line of argument, the viability of a fixed 
exchange rate depends crucially on the markets’ perception of the credibility of the 
peg. If the peg is credible, then the costs involved for the country concerned in 
maintaining the peg should be manageable. However, if markets begin to doubt the 
commitment to the peg – e.g. because of political or economic developments - then 
the maintenance of the peg could require high levels of interest rates. In this latter 
case, the national authorities would have an incentive to abandon the peg, further 
exacerbating the speculative pressure on the currency. A number of episodes during 
the various currency crises of the early 1990s seem to be explicable by this type of 
phenomenon. 
Where do these observations leave us with respect to a possibility of stable 
exchange rates among European economies? The options of achieving a more 
credible fix need to be explored and were explored following the EMS crisis in 1992. 
As already advocated by the Delors report in 1989, EMS countries had to proceed 
from formulation of (in)credible exchange rate rules to a commitment to pursue a 
common monetary policy under a supranational central bank. 
Several possibilities were considered. The option of a DM and Bundesbank 
centred arrangement was neither politically acceptable, nor economically feasible. 
The Bundesbank as a national central bank with a national mandate could not be 
expected to conduct monetary policy with the view of the whole ‘DM-area’. By the 
same token, the Bundesbank could not have credible control over monetary policies 
of other countries of the ‘DM-area’. 
In view of problems accompanying the ERM as well as the political constraints, 
EMU was the obvious option for Europe. It is a credible arrangement for achieving 
exchange rate stability and ensuring continuation of the integration process. By 
eliminating exchange rates altogether and instituting a supranational central bank with 
a common monetary policy, a credible commitment has been made to eliminate once 
and for all exchange rate fluctuations and any divergence in monetary policy between 
the member states. 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) for a discussion of the role of self-fulfilling 
expectations in the EMS 1992 crisis.    14
However, outside theoretical models the credibility of commitments can always 
be questioned. Two potential problems need to be pointed out. First, countries still 
have control over a wide spectrum of policy tools that can lead to a divergence in 
economic policies (e.g. fiscal policy) across the EMU countries. Second, large 
country-specific shocks which alter the benefits and costs of EMU participation for 
individual countries cannot be ruled out. Both of these potential problems are 
discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
 
3.  Economic integration and EMU 
The conviction underlying the Maastricht Treaty was that nominal exchange 
rates should be irrevocably fixed to achieve and maintain a unified single European 
market. Without a single currency and a single monetary policy, the achievements 
made regarding economic integration and the deepening of the Single Market would 
be in danger. Monetary Union in Europe was launched in January 1999 and the single 
currency eliminates, once and for all, internal nominal exchange rate fluctuations and 
supports the continuing process of economic integration. Monetary Union involves 
one supranational central bank, the ECB, and a single monetary policy. At this stage 
we may ask ourselves the famous question: Does one size fit all? 
In view of the uneasy triangle, the main advantage of a flexible exchange rate in 
a world of free international capital mobility is that it allows a country to pursue an 
independent monetary policy. With such a tool at its disposal, the government of a 
country can react by, say, lowering the short-term interest rate when the domestic 
economy is likely to go into a recession after an adverse shock. This raises the issue 
what a country will loose when giving up this instrument. Alesina, Barro and 
Tenreyro (2002) argue that countries showing large co-movements of income and 
prices have the lowest costs from giving up their monetary independence. This 
suggests that the presence of important country-specific shocks make it particularly 
costly to abandon this policy instrument.  
The ability of a country to achieve and maintain low inflation is also a factor 
that can affect the costs of loosing domestic control of the monetary policy 
instrument. Some governments may have an incentive to renege on a credible low 
inflation commitment in order to reduce unemployment (see, for instance, Barro and 
Gordon, 1983). The agents of the economy are likely to learn about such policy   15
behaviour, leading to a loss of credibility and higher inflation. Countries with a 
history of high inflation or low credibility of its monetary policy are therefore less 
likely to face large costs from giving up their monetary policy independence. 
A second advantage of a flexible exchange rate is the shock absorbing role that 
it can play. Although the protection is unlikely to be complete, movements in the 
nominal exchange rate can work to offset some of the effects from a temporary shock. 
In the case of permanent shocks, changes in the nominal exchange rate may also 
facilitate the transition to a new equilibrium. It should, of course, also be kept in mind 
that even if a country has a flexible nominal exchange rate, the economic policy 
response to a given adverse shock may be better addressed through another policy 
instrument than the short-term interest rate. 
Optimum currency areas 
Historically, currency areas have typically coincided with national territory. But 
this does not necessarily mean that all countries are better off when they have their 
own currency. The theory of optimum currency areas (OCA) is a useful framework 
for addressing the question about the appropriate domain of a currency area. Inspired 
by previous work due to Friedman (1953) and Meade (1957), the OCA theory took 
off with the seminal work by Mundell (1961), with essential early contributions by 
McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). Further important contributions to this literature 
include Corden (1972), Mundell (1973), and more recently Tavlas (1993). 
An OCA is the optimal geographic domain of a single currency or of several 
currencies whose exchange rates are irrevocably fixed. Optimality is regarded in 
terms of a set of OCA criteria that are primarily related to the economic integration of 
regions or countries. These criteria include price and wage flexibility, the mobility of 
labour and capital, economic openness, diversification in production and 
consumption, similarity in inflation rates, and fiscal integration. Optimality of a 
currency area can be defined in terms of the above criteria. When shared across 
countries, these criteria reduce the need for nominal exchange rate adjustments, foster 
internal and external balances and help to isolate individual countries from certain 
shocks. A “meta” criterion that has been suggested is the similarity of shocks and the 
responses to these. That is, the synchronisation of shocks and cycles (see, e.g., 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1993, and Giannone and Reichlin, 2005).   16
The empirical literature on the status of the euro area as an OCA is too 
extensive for me to present in much detail in this article. Instead I will only 
summarize some of the evidence with the United States as a reference for 
comparisons. For a survey of this literature the interested reader is referred to 
Mongelli (2002) and references therein. 
The euro area countries performed unfavourably in comparison with the United 
States in terms of price and wage flexibility before the start of EMU (see, e.g., OECD, 
1999). Improvements in price stability had been achieved, but structural reforms 
overall still lacked ambition. But, one can expect that the drive to continue 
implementing the Single Market Programme and product market reforms is likely to 
have a positive impact on its future development. Furthermore, one important factor 
behind the relatively low price flexibility is low wage flexibility. In this respect, 
several labour market institutions seem to be particularly important when attempting 
to explain the latter. 
Labour mobility could alleviate some of the problems linked to low wage 
flexibility. The empirical evidence, however, suggests that it is roughly 2-3 times 
lower in Europe than in the United States (OECD, 1999). Bertola (2000), for example, 
suggests that quantity and price factors of labour market rigidity are connected and 
that lack of employment flexibility with wage rigidity reinforce one another. For a 
recent study on structural reforms in labour and product markets, see Duval and 
Elmeskov (2005). 
On the positive note, the euro area countries are highly diversified and tend to 
behave more as a group than the United States. For instance, Krugman (1993) 
provides evidence that the degree of specialisation is larger in the United States than 
in Europe. OECD (1999) examines the degree of similarity in the composition of 
consumption across euro area countries and finds evidence of very high similarities in 
most countries. Accordingly, the greater homogeneity among the euro area countries 
together with lower degree of specialisation suggests that they are less likely to suffer 
from asymmetric shocks than regions in the United States. 
Furthermore, financial market integration is high and rising (see ECB, 2005). 
This OCA criterion is usually evaluated using the intensity of cross-border financial 
flows, the law of one price, as well as similarities in financial institutions and markets. 
Regarding asset price differentials, for example, yield differentials among euro area   17
government bonds have converged significantly (see, e.g., Baele, Ferrando, Hördahl, 
Krylova and Monnet, 2004, and ECB, 2006). 
Regarding trade integration of the euro area countries, the empirical evidence is 
favourable. Due to the price liberalisation process, stimulated also by the 
implementation of the Single Market Programme, and the deepening of industry trade, 
prices of tradables are becoming more aligned across the EU (see, e.g., Beck and 
Weber, 2001). Furthermore, differences in inflation rates across euro area countries 
have been declining over the past 20 years, a period during which inflation rates have 
converged to levels consistent with price stability (for a recent study, see Angeloni 
and Ehrmann, 2004). As a consequence of this convergence process, EMU began in a 
low inflation environment and the stability-oriented monetary policy of the ECB has 
succeeded in keeping inflation low. National developments and catching-up effects 
will continue to cause some inflation differentials, but these are self-correcting and 
can therefore be expected to be limited in time. 
Effects of monetary union 
At this stage it is worthwhile to mention some important limitations of the OCA 
theory. First and foremost, the theory is backward-looking and thus cannot account 
for the fact that a monetary union of 12 European countries already exists. The 
economic and institutional framework of the euro area and the EU is also changing 
over time and this has an impact on the status of the OCA criteria. Specifically, 
monetary union is a structural change and as such has an effect on the behaviour of 
the euro area economies at both macroeconomic and microeconomic levels. The two 
main sources of behavioural change that have been suggested in the academic 
literature are often referred to as the specialisation and the endogeneity of OCA 
hypotheses. 
The specialisation hypothesis predicts that as countries become more integrated 
they will specialise in the production of those goods and services where they have a 
comparative advantage (see Krugman, 1993, and Krugman and Venables, 1996). A 
consequence of this prediction is that production becomes more specialized across 
countries of a monetary union and incomes across countries therefore less correlated.
6 
                                                 
6 See Frankel (1999) for a critique on this hypothesis based on the instability of such a process.   18
If this specialisation force is strong enough, the OCA status of the currency area could 
weaken. 
The endogeneity of OCA hypothesis, in contrast, predicts that there is a positive 
relation between trade integration and income correlation (see Frankel and Rose, 
1998). The intuition behind this claim is that monetary integration reduces trading 
costs beyond those related to nominal exchange rate volatility. Among other things, a 
common currency prevents devaluations and thus removes risks linked to devaluation 
expectations. It also facilitates foreign direct investment, the building of stable long-
term relationships, and may encourage political integration. This, in turn, further 
promotes reciprocal trade as well as economic and financial integration and business 
cycle synchronisation. 
There is some empirical support for both of these hypotheses. For instance, 
Rose (2000) uses a gravity model to assess the separate effects of exchange rate 
volatility and currency unions on international trade and finds evidence of a large 
positive effect of currency unions. This suggests that the endogeneity of OCA criteria 
is potentially a strong force. Other studies, such as Persson (2001), argue that this 
effect is lower and statistically highly uncertain.
7 Alesina et al. (2002) applies a 
different methodology than the gravity model and reports evidence that currency 
unions are likely to increase co-movements of prices and, potentially, of output.  
Beck and Weber (2001), using a methodology similar to Engel and Rogers 
(1996), investigate the impact of the introduction of the euro on goods market 
integration. Based on data for 81 European cities in six euro area countries (and in 
Switzerland for controls), the study finds that there has been a strong decline in cross 
border volatility of relative prices since January 1999. In fact, border effects have 
been reduced to 20 percent of pre-EMU levels, although distance and border effects 
still matter post-EMU. Engel and Rogers (2004) study prices on a variety of 
comparable goods and services across a large number of cities worldwide over the 
period 1990 to 2003. For the euro area countries they find a decline in price dispersion 
over much of the 1990s but no evidence of price convergence after the introduction of 
the euro. Engel and Rogers suggest that their results may either be explained by the 
short sample after January 1999 or by other developments in the EU, such as the 
Single Market Programme, which contributed greatly to market integration 
                                                 
7 See also Rose (2001) for a response to Persson’s results and Baldwin (2005) for a thorough discussion 
of this topic and further references to the literature.   19
throughout the 1990s. By 1999 the markets for consumer goods were already highly 
integrated. For in-depth discussions on various “endogeneities of OCA’s”, see, for 
example, De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005). 
To summarize, the euro area may not yet be an optimum currency area to the 
extent that the United States is. It scores well in terms of several OCA criteria and has 
great potential for considerable improvements concerning, for example, price and 
wage flexibility. But with the specialisation and endogeneity of OCA hypotheses in 
mind, static thinking in terms of costs and benefits at a certain point in time can be 
highly misleading. It is possible that a large share of the costs of monetary union 
occur during the early years, while many of the benefits become important more 
gradually. In fact, the net benefits may not even be guaranteed, but depend on future 
economic developments, the policies that are carried out, and on the implementation 
of institutional reforms. The OCA criteria where the euro area performs poorly can be 
greatly affected by structural reforms. Let me therefore turn my attention to some 
political aspects of monetary union. 
 
4.  Political aspects of monetary union 
The creation of a monetary union raises some interesting issues of political 
nature, not present in other exchange rate arrangements. In particular, monetary union 
requires a transfer of monetary sovereignty from national authorities to a common 
central bank and irrevocably fixes the nominal exchange rate. This reduces the scope 
for national governments to stabilise the domestic economy. In this environment, 
major adjustments in the national policy domain are necessary. 
Need for flexible markets 
The major source of external imbalances before EMU was due to different 
degrees of inflation across countries, which made readjustments of national exchange 
rates necessary. In Monetary Union this adjustment tool is no longer available and the 
monetary policy regime is the same for all member countries. Therefore, a 
straightforward consequence of monetary union is that nominal contracts in general 
and wages in particular have to respect this regime switch, thereby avoiding the need 
for adjustments which were necessary before.   20
Beyond this fundamental principle, need for economic adjustments between the 
EMU member states is likely to remain a policy concern for the national governments. 
In this regard, it has been argued rather convincingly in the academic literature that 
national policies should focus on increasing market flexibility, in particular, product 
market flexibility, labour market flexibility as well as financial integration. 
The arguments in favour of flexibility are well known.
8 More flexible nominal 
prices and wages ensure that the adjustment process, induced by a negative shock, is 
less likely to lead to sustained adverse changes in economic fundamentals (e.g. 
unemployment). Similarly, labour mobility reduces the need to alter real factor prices 
between countries and financial integration allows for more risk sharing across the 
members of a monetary union. 
The state of market flexibility in EMU was already discussed in the previous 
section. It should be stressed that in recent years we have witnessed significant 
improvements in market flexibility across the EMU, yet more reforms and progress 
are urgently required. This is particularly the case for labour markets, where the 
degree of flexibility remains limited. Real wages adjust much more slowly to 
economic shocks in the EMU than in the United States. Also labour mobility in the 
EMU is relatively low. Furthermore, this applies even to inter-regional and 
occupational mobility within the EMU countries. The existence of various barriers, 
institutional and administrative, makes large-scale migration in the EMU an unlikely 
– and considering cultural diversity probably also an unwelcome – response to 
economic shocks.
9 
Need for a fiscal framework 
Another implication of monetary union is that the usual interplay between fiscal 
and monetary authorities at the national level is replaced by a potentially more 
complex interaction between a group of national governments and a common central 
bank.  Should the common monetary policy be accompanied by any restrictions on the 
fiscal policies of the member states? 
One important recent fiscal development has been the dramatic narrowing of the 
interest rate spreads on government debt which started already in the run up to EMU 
                                                 
8 See Mongelli (2002) for a comprehensive survey of these arguments. 
9 See OECD (1999) for a detailed study of price and labour market flexibility in Europe.   21
(see Figure 1). While some of the decrease can be attributed to global economic 
conditions during the period, there is no doubt that a dominant share of the trend is a 
consequence of the elimination of exchange rate risk from national debt (see ECB, 
2006, and Detken, Gaspar and Winkler, 2004). 
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As a result, we have an integrated European bond market, but at the same time 
an important channel for restraining unsound fiscal behaviour at the national level has 
been lost. The considerably smaller premium that less prudent governments have to 
pay on their debt presents a problem for the union. Given the muted interest rate 
response, each member state is exposed to incentive of running a higher level of 
public debt. In essence, while potential short term economic and especially political 
benefits of excessive government spending continue to accrue at the national level, 
fiscal authorities fail to fully internalize the costs of their debt policies. In equilibrium 
this would lead to higher public debt levels and eventually higher interest rates in the 
whole union. 
In principle, market forces should help to constrain the less prudent 
governments. Indeed, numerous studies (see e.g. Codogno, Favero and Missale, 2003, 
Bernoth, von Hagen and Schuknecht, 2004) show that yield spreads across the EMU   22
countries are positively correlated with fiscal vulnerability. However, the constraints 
imposed by financial markets tend to be either too slow and weak or too sudden and 
disruptive and, therefore, cannot single-handedly ensure sound public finances. As 
was already well recognized long before the start of EMU (see Delors Report, 1989), 
a common market and currency require a fiscal framework, which constrains national 
policies. 
It is instructive to note here that similar ‘debt bias’ problems are present in a 
single country setting. The build-up of public debt in many industrialized countries 
since the 1970s has lead to an extensive literature addressing this topic. The issues 
involved are by now well understood. The usual arguments draw on some political 
distortion, resulting from short-sightedness of policy-makers, and lead to excessive 
levels of public debt.
10 There is a consensus among economists that such ‘debt bias’ 
has significant negative welfare effects. Furthermore, constraints on fiscal policy, 
especially in the form of institutional constraints, can help to alleviate the problem.
11 
Interestingly, one of the findings in this literature is that countries with more 
decentralized budget processes exhibit more ‘debt bias’. The EMU without well-
functioning fiscal constraints can be seen as an extreme case of such decentralization. 
Another argument in favour of fiscal constrains is offered by the literature 
examining the complex interaction between national fiscal authorities and a 
supranational central bank. Dixit and Lambertini (2003) show that in a setting of a 
monetary union discretionary fiscal policies of the member states can undermine the 
monetary commitment of the common central bank. Chari and Kehoe (2003) and 
Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) in turn argue that without the monetary policy 
commitment, fiscal policy has a free-riding problem and restrictions on national fiscal 
policies may be desirable. Similar conclusions are reached by Uhlig (2002) after 
examining different potential EMU crisis scenarios, including possibilities of fiscal 
and systemic crises. 
To be sure, there is also some concern about the costs that come with 
restrictions on fiscal policy. Under a common monetary policy, fiscal policy is the 
main domestic tool available to handle country-specific shocks. There is, however, a 
general scepticism in the literature about the ability of fiscal policy to handle shocks 
beyond the effects of automatic stabilizers. In addition to undermining soundness of 
                                                 
10 See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a summary of the main theoretical arguments. 
11 For a survey see Fatas and Mihov (2003).   23
budgetary positions, discretionary fiscal policies have too often proved to be pro-
cyclical rather than counter-cyclical, thereby exacerbating macroeconomic 
fluctuations (see Issing, 2005). 
Overall, despite the ongoing debate about the exact shape of the fiscal 
restrictions, there is an overwhelming consensus in the literature in favour of the 
necessity of a fiscal framework in a monetary union. 
The response of the EMU to this challenge has been the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) (see Schuknecht, 2004). Unfortunately, the implementation of SGP has 
proved problematic, in particular, the enforceability of its rules. The SGP, and the 
necessity of a fiscal framework in general, are being heavily tested by several 
countries, especially by those which are subject to the excessive deficit procedure. 
It appears that there was no widespread and deep understanding about the 
implications that signing the Maastricht Treaty and joining EMU would have on the 
domestic policy domain. Policies pursued by the national governments, in particular 
fiscal and labour market policies, need to be consistent with the framework set by the 
monetary policy of the central bank following its mandate of maintaining price 
stability. To achieve this, EMU needs to continue to catalyse reforms with a steady 
support from all member states. 
Monetary Union and Political Union 
Monetary union as a corner solution raises an issue which is singular for all 
options of exchange rate regimes. Only monetary union implicitly and unavoidably 
requests reflections on the complementarily, if not precondition, of a political union. 
The need for a fiscal framework is already a step in that direction. But monetary 
union in itself already has a clear political dimension. The transfer of national 
sovereignty in such an important field as the currency to a supranational institution – 
in the case of EMU from national central banks to the ECB – is a substantial 
contribution to political integration. A central bank is, after all, an element of 
statehood. 
A common central bank conducting a single monetary policy, an efficient 
framework for fiscal discipline and flexible markets comprise an institutional 
arrangement on which monetary union can deliver the expected positive results. This   24
leaves open the question on future steps in the direction of a fully fledged political 
union (see Issing, 2004).   25
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DISCUSSION 
 
Mario I. Blejer 
Director, CCBS, Bank of England 
 
 
  Otmar Issing’s paper on the evolution of thinking about monetary unification, 
the analytical underpinnings of the single currency, and the actual experience since 
the introduction of the Euro, is an excellent survey of the many issues raised by this 
truly historical and unique event. It covers a wide spectrum of subject and clarifies, 
with the insider’s hindsight, a variety of questions that are an integral part of this 
distinctive process 
  A particular focus of Issing’s paper is to consider the European Monetary 
Unification (EMU) process as an optimal alternative to the fixing of exchange rates 
among the European Union members (but without actually adopting a common 
currency). It is sustained that the dynamics of European integration necessitates the 
maintenance of high degree of exchange rate stability. This is so because continuous 
exchange fluctuations, volatility, and uncertainty cannot but be detrimental to the 
integration process, retarding it and reducing its reach and deepness. Initial attempts 
to reduce these harmful effects led to exchange rate agreements that were not, 
generally, very successful. Issing’s  paper convincingly argues that the monetary 
unification route has been, indeed, the most suitable one, given European needs and 
circumstances—despite the fact that it is not easy to make the case that optimal 
currency area conditions were holding, at least at the time of the Euro’s inception.  
Within this context, Issing points out that, despite the analytical and practical 
superiority of currency unification, there are two potential problems that can 
complicate policy implementation and that could also weaken the positive 
implications of EMU. He stresses (i) the possible divergence in economic policies 
(particularly at the fiscal level, but also regarding structural policies) and the 
implications that such divergences have for the smooth operation of a monetary 
union; and  (ii) the fact that country-specific shocks could be more difficult to 
accommodate in the absence of country-specific monetary and exchange rate 
instruments. 
In addition to the considerations exposed in the paper, it is possible to suggest 
that these two problems could interact between them and could also interact with   29
other country-specific conditions, resulting in serious divergences in price behaviour 
that bring about different performances of the real exchange rates (see Figure 1). 
This, in turn, leads to differential competitiveness patterns and divergent evolution of 
trade variables (Figure 2).  
While these asymmetries could lead to worrisome conflicts among the 
members of the monetary union—and some of these potential tensions are analysed in 
the paper—it is also possible to focus, alternatively, on some of the potential benefits 
of monetary union, when compared with the alternative of attempting to create a 
system of national currencies linked by a strong peg. Two of these potential benefits 
that I would like to highlight are: (i) the “internationalization” of the Euro, i.e., the 
enhancement of the international role of the single currency; and (2) the role of the 
Euro in facilitating the integration of European financial markets 
The Euro as a world currency 
It is possible to assess, after a few years of operation, the success of the Euro 
in establishing itself as one of the major currencies in the financial world.
1 In this 
sense one should weigh up the various quantitative measures available and measure to 
what extent there has been a universal recognition of the Euro as an important player 
in the foreign exchange markets. One traditional measure of the acceptance of a 
currency as an international store of value is its share in international reserve 
holdings. On this account, the Euro has done better than the currencies of the 
countries that founded it. Compared with them, the share of international reserves 
maintained in Euro denominated assets is up from 14 % in 1999 (versus 65 % for the 
US Dollar) to the current 22 % (versus. 63 % for U$S). 
The role of the Euro as an invoicing currency is also up substantially, but 
where the Euro has done particularly well is as a currency of securities issuance. In 
this area, the Euro took off dramatically from the very outset and is, currently, on a 
par with the U.S. dollar. Where the Euro has done less well is in the foreign exchange 
market. As can be seen in Table 1, the Dollar is still strongly dominant and there has 
been small changes since the Euro inception. It is interesting to stress that this is not a 
small or a stagnant market but one that has grown immensely in the past few years 
and today more than U$S 120 billion are transacted every day in that market. 
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive treatment of this subject, see Portes (2004)   30
In summary, the Euro has made inroads as a world-class currency and has 
improved over its founding currencies in many regards. However, it has not yet 
challenged the US Dollar as the main world currency and is not fully reaping the 
benefits of its world currency status. Moreover, the Euro Zone does not speak with a 
single voice and lacks a clear role in international financial policy – the Zone has had 
only minor, although currently increasing, influence on the financial architecture 
debate. 
Financial integration in Europe 
  The second potentially positive upshot of the choice of monetary unification 
over a system of rigid exchange rates is the potential consequences on the speed of 
financial market integration. The question to be asked is to what extent there are 
clearly identifiable supportive effects arising from the single currency on the observed 
developments in the European financial markets.  
  A detailed ECB study on the subject
2 concludes that the developments have 
been quite uneven in the various different layers of the financial market. They analyse 
the money, government bond, corporate bond, equity, and credit markets and cannot 
reach a unified conclusion.  
Following a detailed analysis of each of the above mentioned markets the 
study concludes that integration is “near perfect” in the money market since 
dispersion in Euro Area unsecured  lending rates reduced to almost zero, for most 
maturities. Similarly, integration is very high in government bond market, 
“reasonable” in corporate bond and in equity markets, and low in credit markets 
(covering mainly short and medium term loans to enterprises, consumer loans, and 
mortgages). 
  Of particular interest is the conclusion, that there has been a very high degree 
of integration in the government bond market, reflected by the strong convergence of 
yields, even among countries with quite dissimilar performance (See Figure 3). While 
this can be attributed to the elimination of exchange rate risk, as pointed out by Issing, 
it is also likely that convergence arises from a reduction in the perception of default 
risk. This, in turn, may reflect the market view that the “no-bailing out clause” is not 
really credible. In other words, it could be strongly believed by market participants 
                                                 
2 See Baele et alt (2004) for a detailed analysis of the various aspects of financial integration in Europe.   31
that members of the Euro zone will not default on their debt, even if they confront 
extreme financial stress, because there would be collective action within the zone to 
prevent non-payment from any country adopting the Euro. While observationally this 
could be equivalent to the elimination of exchange risk, the consequences, particularly 
in terms of moral hazard, could be quite different. 
  A very actual issue that could be brought into the discussion, in the context of 
financial integration has to do with the recent reappearance of cross-country barriers 
for institutional integration and mergers. While this type of financial market 
protectionism is worrisome in general, it is particularly worrying in the context of 
monetary integration. It is to be hoped that if the problems created by the current 
divergence of economic policies, analyzed in Issing’s paper, are alleviated, these 
trends will not prevent the further strengthening of financial market integration.    32




Source: Financial Times   33
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Figure 3: Germany-Italy Sovereign Debt Differential Yields  
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Table 1:  Currency Shares in Foreign Exchange Trade 
 
   
   2001  2004 
USD  90.3  88.7 
EUR  37.6  37.2 
JPY  22.7  20.3 
GBP  13.2  16.9 
CHF  6.1  6.1 
 
 
Source: BIS Triennial FX Market Survey press release (global market), September 
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It is a great pleasure to comment on this paper by Otmar Issing—especially as 
the two of us have been debating these issues now for a couple of decades. The 
questions we debated many years ago were very similar—albeit less textured than in 
their current incarnation—but I think the answers have evolved considerably. This 
paper covers some of this evolution, but I shall argue that it does not cover all of it. In 
particularly, (a) it exaggerates the insulation properties of flexible exchange rates, and 
underplays the value of joining the euro area, in circumstances where disturbances 
arise from capricious shifts in risk premia in global capital markets; and (b) it ignores 
some new mechanisms of adjustment within the euro area. This latter issue—
exemplified in the work of Elhanan Helpman and others on the implications of new 
models of trade and the theory of the firm for global labor markets—is of particular 
relevance.  
1. The motivation of the paper. 
Let me start, however, with the motivation of the paper. Otmar Issing exploits 
the impossible trinity and the fact that recourse to capital controls was incompatible 
with (and probably unsustainable in) a single market to argue that after the ructions in 
the foreign exchanges in 1992 it became clear that EMU was the only feasible 
solution. Without capital controls one could not have both stable exchange rates and 
independent monetary policies. He throws out the possibility of flexible exchange 
rates because of “the lessons learned from the European history of the first half of the 
20
th century”, so that all that is left is a fixed exchange rate system, and, of the fixed 
rate options, EMU is the most credible, stable, fair, and likely to succeed.  
This is a neat story; but, I fear, the actual path to EMU was less neat and logical. 
The truth lurks in the phrase “what we learned from the European history of the first 
half of the 20
th century”—that is, I see this as a political project at its deepest level, a 
desire to cement together a union through monetary and real integration that would 
make unthinkable the wars waged by our forefathers. The paper gives primacy to the 
                                                 
1 The author thanks, without implication, Jörg Decressin, Hamid Faruqee and Peter Isard for helpful 
comments. The views expressed are those of the author and should not be construed as the views of the 
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economic logic, and it returns to the political issues only on the last page. My take on 
the history is that political forces were primary drivers of the whole economic project.  
2. The limits to monetary independence under flexible exchange 
rates. 
Let me take up next an analytical issue: Just how much insulation—and 
insulation from what sorts of disturbances—do flexible exchange rates provide? 
Flexible exchange rates can facilitate an independent choice on inflation, but they do 
not insulate the economy from external financial influences. It is easy to show that 
global influences on interest rates and risk premia can exert a huge influence on 
(actual or incipient) capital flows into a particular country and that country’s 
exchange rate or credit expansion, its inflation of both goods and asset prices, its 
competitiveness, and all the other macroeconomic variables in the economy.
2  
If, for example, Italy had opted to float instead of joining the monetary union, 
and for some exogenous reason there had been a sudden upward shift in the risk 
premium on the Italian lira, either the BdI would have had to raise interest rates—so 
much for an independent monetary policy aimed at domestic needs—or it would have 
faced a substantial depreciation. In this latter case it may well have lost control of 
inflation, especially if there was a degree of downward real wage rigidity. Joining 
countries together in EMU is a way of reducing the influence of capricious shifts in 
risks on individual currencies. 
EMU moreover does something a peg, and even a hard peg, cannot do. Pegged 
currencies, by seeming to provide a government guarantee on the exchange rate, 
encourage foreign exchange exposure. The Baltics, for example, with their very low 
capital:labor ratios and high real returns to capital, have seen huge capital inflows, 
rapid credit growth, wide current account deficits, and large and growing euro 
exposure.
3 As long as they are outside the euro area, there is a probability that a 
sudden rise in risk premia will elicit a reversal of capital flows and a balance sheet 
crisis. But joining the euro area—really the seemingly irreversible act of abandoning a 
                                                 
2 See Lipschitz, Lane, and Mourmouras (2005). 
3 Note that, since the Asian crisis, much of the discussion about the relative merits of exchange regimes 
has focused on the problem that implicit exchange rate guarantees encourage foreign exchange 
exposure; the resulting balance sheet vulnerabilities can easily produce a “fear-of-floating” syndrome, 
delaying adjustment and exacerbating the eventual crisis. A free floating regime has the major 
advantage of discouraging excessive foreign exchange exposure.    39
domestic currency for the euro—would change this. To be sure, individual borrowers 
would still be at risk—if some go bankrupt the shock to the macroeconomy will 
depend on the efficiency of the bankruptcy proceedings—but this differs from 
macroeconomic currency risk. 
3. Labor mobility and labor market flexibility  
Issing raises the issues of labor mobility and labor market flexibility in 
revisiting the OCA criteria.
4 He laments the fact that the euro area exhibits much 
lower flexibility and mobility than the US. In mitigation, however, he cites Krugman 
in arguing that the high degree of homogeneity among the euro states will likely 
militate against asymmetric shocks.  
This is an interesting discussion, but it strikes me as incomplete.  
My guess is that the euro area will never have cross-country labor mobility 
anything like that in the US. Blanchard and Katz (BPEA, 1992) have shown that real 
wages in US states that have suffered an adverse shock barely fall at all—the people 
simply pack their bags and leave and real estate prices drop. Without this mechanism 
in Europe, real wages would have to adjust more than in the US for a given shock. I 
wonder, moreover, whether the homogeneity argument will hold for a larger euro 
area—one that eventually includes all the New Member States.  
The conventional wisdom is that there are two solutions: (i) pick a low inflation 
target and work hard at forcing more flexibility in the labor market through the 
learning process of occasional bouts of painful adjustment, or (ii) allow more inflation 
to grease the wheels. Clearly the ECB has opted for the first solution. But I think that 
this whole discussion has become much more interesting and complex of late, and that 
to understand adjustment mechanisms we need to look at the new work of Elhanan 
Helpman and others on trade and the theory of the firm (see, for example, Helpman 
2005). 
Put somewhat crudely, the essential result of this work is that massive increases 
in trade in both final goods and intermediates—coupled with new organizational 
                                                 
4 An incidental quibble: Issing mentions the conventional view that membership in a currency union 
makes sense if cycles are positively and closely correlated. This is true if the shocks emanate from the 
demand side, but not necessarily so if they come from the real economy—e.g., from productivity—as is 
presaged in the Mundell (1973) article cited. Thus, if the economies are characterized by Kydland-type 
real business cycle models, negative correlations may help reduce the variance of consumption in the 
currency union as a whole. (See, for example, Guajardo, 2005.)    40
options like insourcing, outsourcing, and a broad array of locational choices for each 
stage of production—have greatly facilitated adjustment. The bad news for Europe 
from this work is the following: there is now something approaching a global market 
for different categories of labor; if an individual country or a cluster of countries 
wants to set a reservation real wage above the going global rate for raw unskilled 
labor, it will face unemployment and uncompetitiveness; if, for reasons of an 
egalitarian social policy, it seeks to compress wage relativities, it will reduce human 
capital investment and probably precipitate a brain drain.
5 So individual countries or 
areas will not be able to insulate themselves from global wage competition without 
incurring substantial costs. (Of course, to the extent there is some degree of money 
illusion, the absence of an exchange rate instrument exacerbates the problem.)  
There is also, however, some good news for Europe—or, at least, for European 
corporations and their shareholders. Dalia Marin, drawing on this new trade-cum-
theory-of-the-firm literature, finds that German and Austrian firms have done an 
extraordinary job of improving their competitiveness chiefly by subcontracting out a 
great deal of skilled work to the New Member States (see, for example, Marin, 2005). 
Based on a great deal of firm-level data, she finds that, while compressed wage 
relativities have discouraged human capital investment, German and Austrian 
entrepreneurs have gained enormously by exploiting skills and locational advantages 
in the NMS and eastern Europe. Developments of this sort must, eventually, lead to 
greater labor market flexibility in the euro area. I believe, moreover, that EU 
enlargement—together with globalization more generally—is already adding 
substantially to the pressure for flexibility. 
4. Fiscal Policy  
I argued above that one of the advantages of a country joining the euro area was 
that it reduced the likelihood of capricious shifts in currency risk premia. My guess is 
that for countries where the foreign borrowing is private and the fiscal position is 
sound, once they are in the euro area there will simply be discrimination between 
good and bad borrowers in the area as a whole and less country-based discrimination. 
                                                 
5 Perhaps the global price for raw unskilled labor is being set in China. Interesting comparative wage 
costs in manufacturing are provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the US Department of Labor. 
For 2002 in US dollars, hourly wage costs were $24.20 in Germany, $21.40 in the US, $18.25 in the 
UK, $3.92 in Hungary, $3.83 in the Czech Republic, and $0.63 in China. Of course, the more relevant 
comparison is in unit labor costs—i.e., productivity-adjusted wage costs.   41
This disappearance of an aggregate foreign exchange risk premium is good news for 
individual private borrowers. I agree with Otmar, however, that the virtual 
disappearance of market premia on government debt—that is, the failure of markets to 
discriminate between responsible and irresponsible fiscal policies—is a problem. If 
markets will not exert discipline then there needs to be a rigorous fiscal framework to 
restrain renegade governments.  
Having said this, I have no idea how one goes about setting up an ideal fiscal 
framework.  
Clearly fiscal policies are the principal mechanism for dealing with uncorrelated 
cycles, so they should be able to be differentiated across countries. The SGP allows 
for such differentiation—even for deviations from the 3% of GDP limit in the event of 
a recession (albeit not in the event of a prolonged period of sub-par growth).  
There is some infatuation with the idea of letting the automatic stabilizers play 
out, but this seems odd to me. The stabilizers depend on the structure of the tax and 
welfare systems and, last time I looked, they were quite different for different 
countries. If a one percentage point drop below the sustainable (potential) growth rate 
elicits an increase in the government deficit of half a percentage point of GDP in 
Germany but only one tenth of a percentage point in Greece, for example, one would 
have to ask which is the appropriate response. If the German response is sensible, this 
would argue that Greece should couple its automatic stabilizers with some 
discretionary support—provided, of course, that this support could really be removed 
subsequently.  
Ideally one would want a really wise and fair body to examine each case on its 
merits with the added concern about precedents and the implications for the euro area 
as a whole. The notion of an independent Fiscal Policy Authority is not appealing—
fiscal policy is so much the business of government that one cannot subcontract it out 
to technicians and remove it from the political arena—but a group of nonpartisan 
experts to help elevate the political debate may not be a bad idea. 
As I said, I have no special wisdom in this area. One hopes only that the current 
muddling through will gradually, over time, arrive at some sort of consensus on 
sensible and equitable sanctions for irresponsible policies.  
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5.  Conclusion 
Reading this paper has been a great pleasure. It reminds me of how far we have 
come in these discussions over the last decade or two, of how far we still have to go, 
and most of all of just how privileged many of us have been to be such close 
witnesses to this history. It also reminds me of the important role that Otmar Issing 
has played in this great intellectual and political journey.    43
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